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MARRIAGE DISSOLUTION: AN EQUITABLE
APPROACH TOWARD PROPERTY DISTRIBUTION
Tibbetts v. Tibbetts1
David and Donna Tibbetts purchased a house as joint tenants. The
wife contributed $5,000 toward the purchase price with funds acquired
prior to marriage. The parties later were divorced. 2 At the divorce proceeding, the trial court refused to distribute the house. The superior court
amended the decree only to clarify the basis of the trial court's decision,
that the house was not marital property and that recognition of the interests of the parties as joint tenants was sufficient to set apart the property
without making further division.2
The Maine Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that the
involvement of the wife's $5,000 in the purchase of the house did not
completely exclude the property from the marital property category. The
court further held that although the statute 4 excludes from marital prop1. 406 A.2d 70 (Me. 1979).
2. Id. at 73.
3. The wife appealed the original divorce judgment, claiming that the
judgment did not clearly reflect the treatment accorded to the wife's $5,000
involved in the purchase of the houe. The superior court remanded to the trial
court for further findings of fact. The trial court declined to distribute the
houe. The wife appealed again, urging that the trial court was not "setting
apart" the jointly held property as required by ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 722-A
(Supp. 1979).
4. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 722-A (Supp. 1979) provides in part:
1. Disposition. In a proceeding: (a) for a divorce ... , the court
shall set apart to each spouse his property and shall divide the
marital property in such proportions as the court deems just
after considering all relevant factors....
2. Definition. For purposes of this section only, "marital property" means all property acquired by either spouse subsequent
to the marriage except:
A. Property acquired by gift, bequest, devise or descent;
B. Property acquired in exchange for property acquired prior
to the marriage or in exchange for property acquired by
gift, bequest, devise or descent;
C. Property acquired by a spouse after a decree of legal separation;
D. Property excluded by valid agreement of the parties; and
E. The increase in value of property acquired prior to the
marriage.
3. Acquired subsequent to marriage. All property acquired by
either spouse subsequent to the marriage and prior to a decree of legal separation is presumed to be marital property
regardless of whether the title is held individually or by the
spouses in some form of co-ownership such as joint tenancy,
tenancy in common, tenancy by the entirety, and community
property. The presumption of marital property is overcome
by a showing that the property was acquired by a method
listed in subsection 2.
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erty all property acquired in exchange for property acquired before marriage, it did not follow that where a part of the property exchanged was

non-marital, the entire property, as a result, was non-marital.
The Maine statute dealing with disposition of property at divorce substantially tracks section 307 of the Uniform Marriage and Dissolution Act
as drafted in 19705 and is nearly identical to Mo. Rev. Stat. section 452.330.0
These new marriage and dissolution acts have forced common law jurisdictions to deal with alien concepts of "marital" and "non-marital" or
"separate" property. In a dissolution proceeding, the court must "set apart"
to each spouse his separate property. The court then must divide the

marital property in a just manner.7 Property acquired during marriage by
either spouse is presumed to be marital property unless it qualifies as
separate property under one of the statutory exceptions. The exception
involved in Tibbetts was the exclusion from marital property of "property
acquired in exchange for property acquired prior to the marriage." The
term, "acquired in exchange for" poses interpretive difficulties in the
Tibbetts situation where non-marital and marital properties are combined
to purchase a single asset during marriage. The Tibbetts court rejected
the finding that the wife's $5,000 contribution from separate funds rendered
the house entirely non-marital.8 The Maine Supreme Court also had
previously rejected the proposition that real estate acquired by a husband

and wife, partially in exchange for property acquired prior to marriage and
with the balance secured by a mortgage loan, was wholly marital. 9 In
Maine, a single item of property acquired during the marriage can be to
some extent non-marital and the remainder marital.

Under Tibbetts, that portion of property acquired during marriage
that can be "traced" to separate funds remains separate. This may be
5. Colorado, Kentucky, Maine, and Missouri have adopted modified versions
of § 307 of the UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DISSOLUTION Acr as promulgated in 1970.
CoLo. REV. STAT. § 14-10-113 (1973); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 403.190 (Baldwin Supp.
1978); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 722-A (Supp. 1979); RSMo § 452.330 (1978). In
1973, § 307 was withdrawn from the Uniform Act and was replaced with two
alternative provisions. Alternative A was recommended for general adoption. It
eliminated the distinction between marital and non-marital property for distribution purposes. Alternative B was recommended for adoption by community
property states.
6. The slight variation in the Missouri statute concerns the factors to be
considered in dividing the marital property. Compare RSMo § 452.330.1 (1978)
with ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 722-A(1) (Supp. 1979).
7. See, e.g., ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 722-A(1) (Supp. 1979); RSMo
§ 452.330.1 (1978). Missouri courts have held that the court's obligation to divide
the marital property is mandatory. Corder v. Corder, 546 S.W.2d 798 (Mo. App.,
K.C. 1977); Davis v. Davis, 544 S.W.2d 259 (Mo. App., K.C. 1976); L.F.H. v.
R.L.H., 543 S.W.2d 520 (Mo. App., St. L. 1976).
8. It is not dear from the opinion why the lower courts reached the decision that the entire house was non-marital property. The superior court decree
simply recognized the legal interests of the parties as joint tenants as sufficiently
set apart without further division or distribution. 406 A.2d at 74.
9. Young v. Young, 329 A.2d 386 (Me. 1974).
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significant in Missouri property division litigation for two reasons. First,
Tibbetts stands for the proposition that where property is acquired during
marriage in exchange for both marital and non-marital properties, the
statute requires the divorce court to separate marital and non-marital
interests to the extent that contributions made by each spouse can be
traced or identified. Although two recent Missouri decisions passively
seemed to approve the tracing theory,10 none have dealt with facts establishing tracing. Second, Tibbetts adopted the "source of funds" rule
for determining separate and marital estates in a single asset acquired
during marriage with both separate and marital funds."1
The "tracing" or "source" doctrine is rooted in community property
principles and dates from ancient Spanish law.1 2 Mo. Rev. Stat. section
452.330 adopted the basic structure used by community property states'3
for distinguishing separate property from marital property. Although Missouri courts have not formally adopted community property principles,
these principles by analogy are instructive.' 4 According to community
property rules, property acquired by one or both spouses during marriage
is presumed to be community property. The most common method of
overcoming this presumption in favor of community ownership is by
tracing back to a separate property source.' 5 "Where property is exchanged
for other property or is sold and the proceeds of the sale are used to buy
other property, the property bought is of the same character as that given
in exchange or sold."' 0 This rule is based on equitable principles: the fund
that furnished the consideration should be reimbursed for its contribution.
Despite its equitable appeal, tracing presents difficulties under the
new marriage and dissolution acts just as it did under Spanish community
property law. Under Spanish law, tracing could be defeated by showing
that the separate and community properties were commingled to the extent
that it was impossible to distinguish them.' 7 The finding that commingled
10. See In re Marriage of Pate, 591 S.W.2d 384, 389-90 (Mo. App., W.D.
1979); In re Marriage of Morris, 588 S.W.2d 39, 44 (Mo. App., W.D. 1979).
11. 406 A.2d at 75-76.
12. W.

BROCKELBANK, THE COMMUNITY PROPERTY LAW OF IDAHO

134 (1962);

Krauskopf, Marital Property at Marriage Dissolution, 43 Mo. L. Ry. 157, 189
(1978).
13. The eight community property states are: Arizona, California, Idaho,
Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, and Washington.
14. For discussion of the development of community property law in the
United States, see E. CLARK, COMMUNITY OF PROPERTY AND THE FAMILY IN NEw
Maxxco

(1956); W. REPPY & W.
STATES (1975); Kirkwood,

DE FUNIAK,

COMMUNITY

PROPERTY

IN THE

Historical Background and Objectives of the
Law of Community Property in the Pacific Coast States, 11 WASH. L. REV. 1
(1936); Lyons, Development of Community Property Law in Arizona, 15 LA. L.
REv. 512 (1955); McKnight, Texas Community Property Law-Its Course of
Development and Reform, 8 CAL. W.L. Rv.117 (1971).
15. W. REPPY & W. DE FuNrAx, supra note 14, at 140.
16. W. BROCKELBANK, supra note 12, at 134.
UNrrE

17. W. DE FUNIAK & M. VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY 125
(2d ed. 1971). See also Laughlin v. Laughlin, 61 Ariz. 6, 143 P.2d 336 (1943);
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property was community property did not, however, arise from the fact of
intermixture but from an impossibility of identification. Where separate
and community properties were commingled beyond recognition, an intent
to make a gift of the separate property to the community was presumed. 18
Missouri courts have applied commingling principles in interpreting
the exception to marital property of property "acquired in exchange for
property acquired prior to marriage."1 9 In Jaeger v. Jaeger,2 0 the husband
purchased stock in his name during marriage. The stock was purchased
with the proceeds from the sale of stock he owned before marriage and of
other stock which was marital property. The court found the new stock to
be marital property, stating:
We do not believe that the "exchange" exception found in
452.330.(2) is applicable when a person uses both his pre-marriage
property and marital property to purchase a new property during
the marriage. In commingling his assets with marital assets, the
spouse has failed to sufficiently segregate his own property. Such
a commingling is indicative of an intent on the part of the owner
of the21 pre-marriage property to contribute it to the marital
estate.
The court indicated that its holding would not preclude tracing, but that
the evidence failed to establish that the husband did not intend a gift
22
upon the marital estate.
Application of the tracing doctrine to property division in Missouri
is further complicated by the common law presumption that a conveyance
of property by one spouse to both spouses in joint tenancy is intended to
benefit the marital estate. 23 The Tibbetts court did not address this issue,
apparently because both parties agreed that no gift to the marital estate
was intended.24 Missouri decisions hold that such property acquired in
joint ownership during marriage is marital property unless it is shown
that: (1) the property was "acquired in exchange for property acquired
prior to marriage"; and (2) the transfer was not intended as a provision
Fisher v. Fisher, 86 Idaho 131, 383 P.2d 840 (1963); Fox v. Fox, 81 Nev. 186, 401
P.2d 53 (1965).
18. W. DE FuNrAK & M. VAUGHN, supra note 17, at 125, 184-85.
19. In re Marriage of Badalamenti, 566 S.W.2d 229, 236 (Mo. App., St. L.
1978); Jaeger v. Jaeger, 547 S.W.2d 207, 211-12 (Mo. App., St. L. 1977).
20. 547 S.W.2d 207 (Mo. App., St. L. 1977).
21. Id. at 211.

22. Id.
23. Under the common law in Missouri, if one spouse pays the consideration

for a conveyance made in joint names, it is presumed that the conveyance was
intended as a settlement upon, or as a provision for a gift to the other spouse.
Gaede v. Smith, 354 Mo. 738, 741, 190 S.W.2d 931, 932 (1945); Lewis v. Lewis,

354 Mo. 415, 422, 189 S.W.2d 557, 560 (1945); Gillispie v. Gillispie, 289 S.W.
579, 581 (Mo. 1926). Conrad v. Bowers, 533 S.W.2d 614, 622 (Mo. App., St. L.

1975) held that RSMo § 452.330 (1978) did not change this common law presumption.
24. 406 A.2d at 74 n.4.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol45/iss3/10
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for settlement or as a gift to the other spouse. 25 Missouri courts have construed the statute to mean that even though jointly titled property or a
portion thereof can be traced to separate funds, the gift presumption must
be overcome by clear and convincing evidence or the property will be
26
deemed marital.
Two recent Missouri decisions appear to recognize that the gift presumption can be overcome so that the portion of the property acquired in
exchange for separate property remains separate. 27 In In re Marriage of
Pate,28 the wife argued that certificates of deposit purchased with funds
from a joint checking account should be classed as marital property. The
husband's premarital assets included the checking account in question into
which both the husband and wife deposited funds during marriage. The
wife drew upon these funds for personal and joint expenses but was not
aware that she was a joint owner of the checking account, if in fact she
was, until trial. The court found from the husband's testimony that he
did not intend to transfer ownership of his premarital assets to his wife
but intended only to afford her the use thereof. Without further discussion, the court found that if the presumption had ever arisen that the
checking account was marital property, it was rebutted. 29
The Pate court did not refer to the tracing doctrine, nor did it hold
that the statute mandates separation of non-marital and marital properties by tracing the contributions made by each spouse if sufficient evidence is presented. Pate, however, does indicate that Missouri courts may
be sympathetic to an argument that a portion of property should be
classed as separate because it can be traced to separate property exchanged for it. Assuming that a court will entertain such an argument,
the presumption of a gift where marital and non-marital properties are
commingled or where property is titled jointly, must be rebutted. Neither
Pate nor Tibbetts indicates what evidence is necessary to rebut this pre25. Jaeger v. Jaeger, 547 S.W.2d 207, 211 (Mo. App., St. L. 1977); Conrad
v. Bowers, 533 S.W.2d 614, 622 (Mo. App., St. L. 1975).
26. See cases cited note 25 supra.
Transmutation is the community property principle whereby separate property is converted to marital property by gift or agreement, express or implied.
See Noble v. Noble, 26 Ariz. App. 89, 546 P.2d 358 (1976); In re Marriage of
Jafeman, 29 Cal. App. 3d 244, 105 Cal. Rptr. 483 (1972). See also In re Marriage
of Moncrief, 36 Colo. App. 140, 535 P.2d 1137 (1975) (applying a statute nearly
identical to the Missouri statute). Cf. Young v. Young, 329 A.2d 386 (Me. 1974)
(holding that prior to the effective date of the new statutory concept of marital
property there could be no intent to convert or transmute separate property to

marital property).
27. In re Marriage of Pate, 591 S.W.2d 384 (Mo. App., W.D. 1979); In re
Marriage of Morris, 588 S.W.2d 39 (Mo. App., W.D. 1979).
28. 591 S.W.2d 384 (Mo. App., W.D. 1979).
29. The court emphasized that the wife was not aware that the checking
account was jointly titled. In determining whether the husband intended to
transmute his separate property to marital property, however, the court's
focus should have been on the husband's intent. Thus the court's reasoning that
the gift presumption may not have arisen is questionable.
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sumption. Under Spanish law, to facilitate proof as to what property was
separate property, it was generally recommended that an inventory be
made of -all premarital property at the time of the marriage contract.3 0
Several community property states approve such a recording by statute.3 1
If the Missouri courts are willing to trace to separate property sources, as
Pate suggests they might be, attorneys should advise clients who wish to
protect separate property to keep records that will facilitate tracing.
Another way to facilitate tracing is to provide by antenuptial contract
which property is separate and which property shall be subject to division
as marital property at dissolution. It was a basic precept of Spanish community property law that spouses could provide by contract which property would be classed as separate property and which would be classed as
community property, or that the spouses could contract away community
property rights altogether.3 2 The law operated on the theory that it
would not regulate the marital partnership unless the spouses failed to
do so. In Missouri, an antenuptial agreement purporting to settle issues
of property division at dissolution is neither contrary to public policy nor
precluded by the Marriage and Dissolution Act if the agreement is conscionable and fairly made. 33 Such an agreement could be updated as new
items of property are purchased to show clearly the contributions furnished from separate and marital sources. Even if the agreement were
unenforceable, it might still guide the court in tracing back to separate
funds.
Tracing is only one step toward an equitable distribution of property
at dissolution. The court also must determine how the separate and marital
estates are to be compensated for their respective contributions. Both the
Missouri statutory definition of marital property34 and the presumption
30...W. DE

FUNIAK & M. VAUGHN, supra note 17, at 123-24.
31. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 5114 (Deering 1972) (authorizes husband
and wife to file an inventory of separate property); IDAHO CODE §§ 32-907, -908
(1968) (authorizes only the wife to file); NEv. Rxv. STAT. §§ 123.140, .160 (1973)
(failure to file an inventory of separate property is prima facie evidence that
the property is not separate).
32. W. DE FUNIAK & M. VAUGHN, supra note 17, at 116.
33. Ferry v. Ferry, 586 S.W.2d 782 (Mo. App., W.D. 1979). Cf. Wilson v.
Wilson, 354 S.W.2d 532, 546 (Mo. App., Spr. 1962) (because the antenuptial
contract rule predated the Marriage and Dissolution Act, contracts will not be enforced unless entered into freely, fairly, knowingly, understandingly, and in
good faith and with full disclosure).
For other cases holding that antenuptial contracts are not contrary to public
policy, see Posner v. Posner, 233 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 1970); Eule v. Eule, 24 Ill. App.
3d 83, 320 N.E.2d 506 (1974); Flora v. Flora, 166 Ind. App. 620, 337 N.E.2d
846 (1976). See also Clark, Antenuptial Contracts, 50 CoLO. L. REv. 150 (1979);
Evans, Antenuptial Contracts Determining Property Rights Upon Death or
Divorce, 47 U.M.K.C. L. REv. 31 (1978).
34. RSMo § 452.330.2 (1978) provides:
For purposes of sections 452.300 to 452.415 only, "marital property"
means all property acquired by either spouse subsequent to the marnage
except:
(1) Property acquired by gift, bequest, devise, or descent;
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in favor of marital property depend on the property having been "acquired" during marriage. Thus, "acquisition" is a key concept in determining the character of certain property at dissolution. Two principal
interpretations of the acquisition concept have evolved. Tibbetts adopted
the "source of funds" rule as opposed to the "inception of title" rule
followed in Missouri.3 5 These rules, borrowed from community property
jurisdictions, generally are applied where right or title to property is
obtained by one party before marriage and the obtention is completed
during marriage with the use of marital funds. 3 6
The "inception of title" rule is the traditional rule of Spanish community property law.3 7 The character of the property is fixed as separate or
marital when the right to title is taken. If title is acquired before marriage,
the property remains wholly non-marital, even if marital funds are expended toward its purchase or maintenance. Under this rule, the marital
community is reimbursed, upon dissolution, in the amount of marital
property used to complete purchase of the property or to enhance its
value.3 8 Any increase in value due to general economic conditions, however, is the separate property of the spouse who acquired title before
marriage.3 9 Extending the logic of the "inception of title" rule to the Tibbetts situation where the house was purchased after marriage and titled
jointly, the wife would have been reimbursed for her contribution of
separate funds but the marital estate would have been entitled to any
increase in value due to economic conditions.
The "source of funds" rule is of more recent origin and can be viewed
as an equitable exception to the "inception of title" rule. 40 The marital and
separate interests are determined by comparing the ratio of marital and
(2) Property acquired in exchange for property acquired prior to the
marriage or in exchange for property acquired by gift, bequest,
devise, or descent;
(3) Property acquired by a spouse after a decree of legal separation;
(4) Property excluded by valid agreement of the parties; and
(5) The increase in value of property acquired prior to the marriage.
35. See, e.g., Davis v. Davis, 544 S.W.2d 259 (Mo. App., K.C. 1976); Stark v.
Stark, 539 S.W.2d 779 (Mo. App., K.C. 1976); Cain v. Cain, 536 S.W.2d 866
(Mo. App., Spr. 1976). The "inception of title" rule as adopted in these cases does
not necessarily preclude application of the tracing doctrine. See In re Marriage
of Pate, 591 S.W.2d 384, 389-90 (Mo. App., W.D. 1979); In re Marriage of Morris,
588 S.W.2d 39, 44 (Mo. App., W.D. 1979). See also text accompanying notes
28-30 supra.
36. See Bartke, Yours, Mine and Ours-Separate Property and Community
Funds, 44 WASH. L. REV. 379, 383 (1969); Note, Dissolution of Marriage-Division of Property Which Has Increased in Value, 42 Mo. L. REv. 479, 480-81
(1977).
37. W. DE FUNrAK & M. VAUGHN, supra note 17, at 133. The Spanish rule
regarding acquisition is followed in New Mexico and Texas. Gillispie v. Gillispie,
84 N.M. 618, 506 P.2d 775 (1973); Hodge v. Ellis, 268 S.W.2d 275 (Tex. Civ. App.
1954).
38. W. DE FUNIAK & M. VAUGHN, supra note 17, at 130-31, 133.
39. Id.
40. 406 A.2d at 76-77 n.9.
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separate investments in the property. Upon dissolution, the separate' and
marital estates receive a proportionate share of any increase in value due
to economic conditions. 41 For example, assume that Donna Tibbetts' contribution of $5,000 from separate funds was the down payment on the
house purchased during marriage and that the total purchase price was
$10,000, the remaining $5,000 being financed through credit. One-half of
the value of the house would be her separate property. If the couple
contributed $5,000 of marital property and if the property appreciated in
value to $20,000, one-half of the value of the house, or $10,000, would be
the wife's separate property at dissolution. The other half, or $10,000,
would be marital property subject to division.
Just as the theory underlying the tracing doctrine is one of equity
and fairness, the same considerations weigh in favor of the "source of funds"
theory. The Tibbetts court relied upon the purpose of the Uniform Marriage and Dissolution Act and upon a dynamic interpretation of the term
"acquisition" to support the contention that the "source of funds" rule is
the more equitable approach. 42
The shared enterprise or partnership theory is a guiding principle in

the separation and division of property at dissolution under the Uniform

Act.4 3 The partnership theory entitles the separate and marital estates,
respectively, to a proportionate share in the value of the property. The
separate and marital estates are entitled to the full benefit and return
from their investments as if they were partners in a business partnership. 44
The partnership theory harmonizes with a dynamic interpretation of
the term "acquisition"; the characterization of the property as marital or
non-marital may shift as items of property, marital or non-marital, are
contributed by the spouses in exchange for the new asset. This dynamic
interpretation is simply a restatement of the "source of funds" rule and is
an interpretation inconsistent with the "inception of title" rule. If acquisition is an ongoing process, it must not be arbitrarily and finally fixed at the

41. The "source of funds" rule is followed in California, Idaho, and Wash-

ington. In re Marriage of Jafeman, 29 Cal. App. 3d 244, 105 Cal. Rptr. 483
(1973); Gapsch v. Gapsch, 76 Idaho 44, 277 P.2d 278 (1954); In re Dougherty's
Estate, 27 Wash. 2d 11, 176 P.2d 335 (1947).
42. The court's discussion of the "source of funds" rule may be dicta in whole
or in part. It is not clear from the opinion whether there was an increase in
value of the property. Assuming that the house did increase in value, that portion
of the opinion that would apply the "source of funds" rule to the situation where
property is titled in one spouse prior to marriage and where acquisition is completed
during marriage is clearly dicta.
43. See HANDBOOK

OF THE NATIONAL

CONFERENCE

OF

COMMISSIONERS

ON

UNIFORM STATE LAws 178 (1970); Krauskopf, A Theory For A Just Division of
Marital Property in Missouri, 41 Mo. L. Rxv. 165, 166 (1976).
44. The commissioners who drafted the Uniform Act recommended that
distribution be treated, as nearly as possible, like the dissolution of a business
partnership. HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF THE COMMISSIONERs ON
UNIFORM STATE LAws 111 (1970).
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point in time when title is incepted. The "inception of title" rule discourages spouses from investing separate property in marital property. If title is
taken by one spouse prior to marriage, it discourages the other spouse
from permitting marital funds to be expended on that separate property.
The rule also discourages the owner of separate property from combining
separate funds with marital funds in order to purchase a new asset during
5
marriage.4
The question left unanswered in Tibbetts is whether application of
the tracing doctrine necessarily implicates acceptance of the "source of
funds" rule. If a fair reading of Tibbetts discloses such a suggestion, the
decision may be an incentive for Missouri courts to re-evaluate their
position. Missouri adopted the "inception of title" rule soon after the new
Marriage and Dissolution Act became effective.4 6 Acceptance of that rule is
understandable in view of the circumstances at that time. The courts were
interpreting a new statute based on unfamiliar concepts and looked to the
traditional community property rule for assistance.
Although the "inception of title" rule is still the majority view, the
proposition that the tracing doctrine and the "source of funds" rule are
interrelated is tenable. Each evolved from the same basic notions of equity
and fairness. Where the original contributions, both separate and marital,
to the purchase of an asset, are insignificant in comparison to a large
increase in the value of the asset, the equitable considerations of the tracing
doctrine would be undermined if the respective estates did not share in
the increase. It is inequitable to deny the marital estate a proportionate
share in the increase in value merely because property was titled in one
spouse prior to marriage, or to deny the separate estate a proportionate
share merely because property was purchased during marriage.
The ultimate goal of the new marriage and dissolution acts is to
achieve a fair and just distribution of property at dissolution. Both the
tracing doctrine and the "source of funds" rule comport with this objective.
Although the "inception of title" rule may have produced equitable results
in old Spain, the rule is outdated in view of present economic conditions.
Property values, in particular those of real estate, have increased dramatically over the past few years. To deny the respective estates a proportionate
share of this increase is patently inequitable. Tibbetts represents an attempt to achieve the equitable result contemplated by the drafters of the
Uniform Act. Missouri courts should reassess their position with the same
goal in mind.
TRINA

J.

POHLE

45. Note, supra note 36, at 484-85.
46. Missouri enacted the Marriage and Dissolution Act in 1973. It became
effective January 1, 1974.
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